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FUTURE INTERESTS-DEOLUTION OF A POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER
IN COLORADO. School Dist. No. Six v. Russell, 396 P.2d 929 (Colo.
1964).
".. . unto the said party of the second part [a school district]
its heirs and assigns forever . . .1
"It is understood and agreed that if the . .. land is abandoned
by the said second parties and not used for School purposes then
the . . . land reverts to the party of the first part."'
This inept language was aptly construed by the Supreme Court
of Colorado in an opinion which is noteworthy both for what is ex-
pressed and for what is necessarily to be inferred from the decision.
If the deed had said, "unto the said party of the second part
its heirs and assigns, so long as the land is used for school purposes,
and no longer, whereupon it shall revert to the party of the first
part and his heirs," the grantee would have had a fee simple with
a special limitation and the grantor would have had a possibility of
reverter.
3
If the deed had said, "unto the said party of the second part its
heirs and assigns, but if the land is abandoned by the said second
party and not used for school purposes then the party of the first
part and his heirs shall have the power to terminate the estate here-
by granted," the grantee would have had an estate in fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent, and the grantor would have had
a power of termination.
4
The actual deed was a hybrid. "If" is the language of condition;
"reverts" is the language of limitation. The court recognized this
difficulty, and avoided subjecting itself to the compulsion of words
that were so obviously inappropriate. Instead, it relied upon the
purpose of the grantor, and a sophisticated rule of construction
quoted from the American Law of Property:
If the purpose is to compel compliance with a condition
by the penalty of forfeiture, an estate on condition arises,
but if the intent is to give the land for a stated use, the es-
tate to cease when that use or purpose is ended, no penalty
for a breach of condition is involved, since the purpose is
not to enforce performance of a condition, but to convey
1 This portion of the deed was not quoted in the court's opinion but may be
found in the Brief of Plaintiff in Error, Appendix A, p. 1.
2 School Dist. No. Six v. Russell, 396 P.2d 929, 930 (Colo. 1964).
3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 44 (1936).
4 Id. § 45.
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the property for so long as it is needed for the purpose for
which it is given and no longer. Therefore, in spite of lan-
guage of condition, if the prevailing purpose is to create a
collateral limitation of this kind, and not to enforce a con-
dition by a threatened forfeiture, a fee on limitation re-
sults."' 5
Under this rule the court determined that the deed had created "an
estate in fee simple determinable,"6 that is a fee simple with a spe-
cial limitation, and that the grantor had therefore retained a poss-
ibility of reverter, not a power of termination. The court did not
mention instances in which a contrary result would be reached un-
der this rule, but it would seem that the "liquor clause" cases would
be good examples.
Having thus classified the reversionary interest as a possibility
of reverter, the court took occasion to refer to its 1939 decision in
Union Colony Co. v. Gallie7 and to correct its "language which has
created confusion and uncertainty in the law with regard to the
problem here presented."'S This return to orthodoxy was not to have
been expected, because in 19631 the court quoted with apparent ap-
proval some of the confusing language in Union Colony Co. v.
Gallie.
What difference did it make in this case whether the reversion-
ary interest was a possibility of reverter or a power of termination?
The answer to this question is very important, but it must be in-
ferred. In 1942 the court had held"' that a one-year statute of limi-
396 P.2d at 931-32. The part of the opinion which includes this quotation did
not appear in the court's original opinion dated November 30, 1964. The
modified opinion of December 21, 1964, however, included the quoted para-
graph.
6 Ibid.
7 104 Colo. 46, 88 P.2d 120 (1939).
8 396 P.2d at 932.
1) Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., 381 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1963).
10 Wolf v. Hallenbeck, 109 Colo. 70, 123 P.2d 412 (1942).
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tations" barred the assertion of a power of termination. Here, in
spite of the School District's contention that the statute was a bar,
and the admitted fact that more than a year had elapsed between
the cessation of use and the bringing of the action, the court sus-
tained the possibility of reverter. The necessary inference is that, as
such, it was not affected by the statute. This had never before been
decided. It is not here expressed, but there is no other way to ac-
count for the decision, and it explains the decisive importance of
the court's classification of the interest. If it had been a power of
termination it would have been barred by the statute; since it was
a possibility of reverter it was not barred. The result can of course
be justified by the fact that a possibility of reverter is automatic
and requires no act upon the part of the one who has it; a power of
termination must be asserted. The statute says, "No action shall be
commenced or maintained to recover . . .or to enforce . . .or to
compel .... 
12
This leaves for consideration what is perhaps the most interest-
ing part of the decision, namely, the devolution of the possibility of
reverter from the time of the grantor's death in 1930.
It was contended that a possibility of reverter was not "subject
to grant, devise or inheritance,"' r and that only those who would
have been the heirs of the grantor at the time of the happening of
the limiting event could represent him at that time and thereby
acquire the estate. The common law authority for this proposition
necessarily relates only to powers of termination upon breach of
conditions subsequent, because there is such a paucity of English
common law relating to possibilities of reverter that it has been
doubted that such an interest could have been created after the
statute of Quia Emptores, 1290.14
The court expressly rejected this argument and adopted the
rule that "the possibility of reverter is cast by descent upon the per-
son's heirs, at the time of his death.' 15 An attempt to apply any rule
other than that of the statute of descent and distribution16 might
11 COLO. STAT. ANNO. 1935, Ch. 40, § 154 (now COLO. REV. STAT. § 118-8-4
(1963)).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. § 118-8-4 (1963).
13 396 P.2d at 930.
14 See, e.g., GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 32 (4th ed. 1942): "In
accordance with the doctrine of the foregoing section, no possibility of
reverter after a determinable fee has been sustained in England since the
Statute Quia Emptores."
15 396 P.2d at 932.
16 The applicable statute, COLO. STAT. ANNO. 1935, Ch. 176, § 1, said, "Any
real estate or property having the nature or legal character of real estate
... shall descend .... " COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-2-1 (1963) is the same.
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lead a court into consideration of such unfamiliar rules of descent
as those pertaining to primogeniture and ancestral lands.
The decision to apply the ordinary rules of descent to possibili-
ties of reverter was all that was said about the devolution of the in-
terest, and the problems of devise and inter vivos conveyance were
apparently left unanswered. However, the court did find that one
Mary Sander was the owner of the estate which had reverted. In
one place it is said that she is "the grantee in a deed from persons
who were the heirs and devisees of the said Agnes F. Russell"'1 7 who
was the sole heir of the grantor. In another place it is said "Mary
Sander secured a deed from persons who, through inheritance and
devise succeeded to the rights originally held by Russell [the
grantor] under the possibility of reverter created by him."s
It is impossible for the same interest to be acquired both by
inheritance and by devise, and whenever a testator appears to de-
vise property to a person who is his heir, it is necessary to consider
the applicability of the doctrine of worthier title in order to deter-
mine whether the person who took the property took as heir or as
devisee. The facts which are needed are, fortunately, included in
Appendix B of the Brief of Plaintiff in Error. It contains an ab-
struct of the chain of title from Herbert A. Russell, the original








17 396 P.2d at 930.
18 396 P.2d at 932.
Deed, Russell to School District.
Herbert A. Russell dies intestate, with widow,
Agnes F. Russell, as sole heir.
Agnes F. Russell dies testate, leaving a brother,
David M. Bell, and sister, Jane B. Darling, with
residue to Jane B. Darling.
Jane B. Darling dies testate leaving her residu-
ary estate to her heirs, Mort W. Darling (hus-
band), and children, Dewey L. Darling, Ray W.
Darling, and Satia May Turner.
Mort W. Darling dies testate with residuary
estate to his heirs, Dewey L. Darling, Ray W.
Darling, and Satia May Turner.
School discontinued at school site but posses-
sion retained by School District.
1964
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May 1, 1962 School District files complaint for quiet title.
Nov. 5, 1962 Sander records October 26, 1962 Quit Claim
Deed from David M. Bell, Dewey L. Darling,
Ray W. Darling, and Satia May Turner.
It is apparent that when the grantor, Herbert F. Russell, died
intestate on June 4, 1930, his possibility of reverter descended to
his only heir, his widow, Agnes F. Russell. When she died, on May
20, 1950, it is to be inferred that her only heirs were a brother and
a sister. It is further to be inferred, since the subsequent links in
the chain of title do not include the brother, that the possibility of
reverter was included in the residuary devise to the sister, Jane B.
Darling. Did she take it as a devisee or as an heir?
This depends upon whether the doctrine of worthier title is
applicable. In a case in which the doctrine was applied, the Su-
preme Court of Oregon quoted Blackstone's statement of the rule:
"But if a man ... devises his whole estate to his heir at law, so
that the heir takes neither a greater nor a less estate by the devise
than he would have done without it, he shall be adjudged to take
descent .... "19
The rule is applicable even though the heir is named, as in the
present case, "to my sister, Jane B. Darling." It has been stated that
the "test . . . is to strike out of the will the particular devise to the
heir, and then, if without that he would take by descent exactly the
same estate which the devise purports to give him, he is in by
descent .... "20
It might appear that in the present case the doctrine would not
be applicable because as heir, the sister would have taken only an
individed one-half interest in the possibility of reverter (the other
half going to her brother), whereas by the residuary clause she was
devised the entire interest. However, under the orthodox rule this
sort of difference would not prevent the application of the doc-
trine.
2 1
There is, though, another factor in this case which does pre-
vent the doctrine from being applicable. As an heir, she would have
inherited with her brother as a tenant in coparcenary, 22 but under
the will she took as tenant in severalty. This difference in tenure
19 Cordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 101 P.2d 414, 415 (1940).
20 Harper & Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title, 24 ILL. L. REV. 627,
635 (1930).
21 Id. at 642.
22 COLO. STAT. ANNO. 1935, Ch. 176, § 1, the applicable statute on May 20,
1950, provided, "it shall descend . . . in parcenary . . . . " COLO. REV.
STAT. § 153-2-1 (1963) is the same.
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is enough to take the devise out of the doctrine of worthier title. 2 3
Therefore, Jane B. Darling took not as heir, but as devisee. Since
the title which was quieted in Mary Sander was derived from Jane
B. Darling, the decision of this case included, by necessary infer-
ence, the first decision that a possibility of reverter was devisable
in Colorado.
24
Nothing pertaining to the devolution of a possibility of reverter
would be gained by a further study of the chain of title. The first
transfer, on June 4, 1930, required a holding that a possibility of re-
verter was inheritable in the ordinary manner in Colorado, and this
was expressly stated by the court. The next transfer on May 20,
1950, necessarily involved a decision that a possibility of reverter
was devisable in Colorado. The decision left unanswered the ques-
tion as to whether a possibility of reverter could be conveyed by
deed in Colorado, because there was no such transfer in this chain
of title until November 5, 1962, after the estate had reverted.
Thompson G. Marsh*
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS-DEFINITION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
-A BELIEF WHICH OCCUPIES A PLACE IN THE LIFE OF ITS POSSESSOR
PARALLEL TO THAT ORDINARILY FILLED BY AN ORTHODOX BELIEF IN
GOD IS A RELIGIOUS BELIEF. United States v. Seeger, 85 Sup. Ct.
850 (1965).
Daniel Seeger claimed exemption from military service as a
conscientious objector,1 but left open the question as to his belief
in a Supreme Being. He declared, however, that his agnostic phi-
losophy did "not necessarily mean lack of faith in a purely ethical
creed. ' '2 Although the government conceded that Seeger's abhor-
23 Harper & Heckel, supra note 20 at 639-640.
24 The applicable statute, COLO. STAT. ANNO. 1935, Ch. 176, § 36, said, "
shall have the power to . . . devise . . . any or all the estate, right, title
and interest in possession, reversion or remainder . . . of, in and to any
lands, tenements, heriditaments, annuities or rents charged upon or issuing
out of them . . . . COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-1 (1963) says, . . . may
devise . . . real . . . property or any interest therein .... .
*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1951) : Seeger's claim was made under § 6(j) of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act:
Nothing contained in this title [§ § 451-454 and 455-471 of this Ap-
pendix] shall be construed to require any person to be subject to
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious train-
ing and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code.
2 85 Sup. Ct. at 854.
